My Police Evidence to the UK Parliament

Home Affairs Committee Written evidence submitted by Kevin Maxwell [LSP 47]

I. Introduction

Kevin Maxwell is black, gay and a former officer of the Metropolitan Police Service’s (MPS’) Special Operations 15 Directorate (SO15). SO15 is a specialist, elite unit with “expertise in intelligence analysis and development, investigation and operational support activity”. It has the ultimate responsibility for “bring[ing] to justice anyone engaged in terrorist, domestic extremist and related offences”.1 Whilst at SO15, Mr. Maxwell was a Special Branch officer based at Heathrow Airport with counter-terrorism responsibilities.

During his four-year tenure with SO15, Mr. Maxwell publicly and bravely challenged racism and discrimination within the MPS. As a result of the continued harassment and discrimination he suffered, Mr. Maxwell was forced to leave a job he always wanted to do and to which he was deeply committed.2 His private information was leaked to The Sun. He was threatened with the Official Secrets Act should he talk about his experiences. Rather than address Mr. Maxwell’s legitimate and serious complaints, instead, Mr. Maxwell believes that the MPS sought to discredit and intimidate him into silence. Such was the victimisation experienced by Mr. Maxwell that he now suffers extensively from the long-term disabling effects of chronic depression, characterised in the main by high anxiety.

On 12 February 2012, an Employment Tribunal (ET) found the MPS responsible for forty-four counts of harassment of and discrimination against Mr. Maxwell. The MPS appealed this decision. On 14 May 2013, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) upheld the original judgment on almost all counts. Despite this clear judgment against it, the MPS continues to refuse to accept its wrongdoing and to fight Mr. Maxwell.3

From the outset, Mr. Maxwell’s intentions have been clear. He does not wish to damage the reputation of the MPS. Instead, he hopes to highlight weaknesses and areas for development within the Service and, by doing so, improve the climate in which black and minority ethnic officers (BME) and LGBT officers serve.

II. Background

After serving with the Greater Manchester Police (GMP) for approximately seven years, in October 2008 Mr. Maxwell joined the MPS’ SO15 team at Heathrow Airport, having come top in Interview Board. During the eight months that followed, Mr. Maxwell suffered regular harassment and discrimination from his fellow colleagues. Two tribunals have held that the basis of abuse was his sexual orientation and the colour of his skin.4

A. First Claim—Failure of senior managers leads to formal claim

In December 2008, Mr. Maxwell first informed senior management at the MPS of the racism and homophobia that he experienced on a near daily basis. Despite a move from the SO15 team based in Terminal 3 to another team in Terminal 5, the discrimination and harassment continued.

These events had such a profound psychological impact upon Mr. Maxwell that he began to suffer from high anxiety and, by summer 2009, displayed signs of severe depression. Given the rapid deterioration of his mental health, on 26 July 2009 a physician placed Mr. Maxwell on sick leave due to stress.

Initially, Mr. Maxwell tried to discuss his concerns with various members of the MPS’ senior leadership team. Their initial response was to ignore or be dismissive of Mr. Maxwell’s concerns. However, when he later raised a grievance, the MPS proceeded to intimidate and victimise Mr. Maxwell in order to silence him.

Indeed, a sizeable proportion of the discrimination and victimisation that Mr. Maxwell faced actually occurred during this “whistleblowing phase”, and whilst he was convalescing. Given the repeated inability of the MPS to handle his complaints satisfactorily, on 14 May 2010 Mr. Maxwell submitted an initial claim to the ET.

B. Second Claim—MPS leaked Mr. Maxwell’s personal information to the press

A short time after submitting his formal claim, Mr. Maxwell received a telephone call from the MPS’ Press Officer, Alex Fedorcio, informing him that The Sun’s then Crime Correspondent, Anthony France, was to publish an unflattering article about him.

Mr. France’s article was to assert that “[Kevin Maxwell] was running a weak claim in order to obtain a significant amount of money [from the MPS]”, that “[he] had a history of submitting unsuccessful claims for race discrimination at other [police] forces including the Greater Manchester Police”, and that his claim was “without foundation”.5

None of these allegations are true. Before submitting his claim on 14 May 2010, Mr. Maxwell had never submitted any other formal complaint. As to this claim being weak, events have now demonstrated that they were, in fact, serious and legitimate. Moreover, two tribunals have now held that the MPS leaked Mr. Maxwell’s private information because he brought a formal claim against them.6 The ET held that the information Mr. France possessed had “a high amount of knowledge”, impossible to discern without a primary source.7

By leaking personal information to the press, not only would the article serve to smear Mr. Maxwell and thus unfairly damage his reputation, but it would also endanger the safety and security of one of the MPS’ own counter-terrorism officers, his then partner, Mr. Alex Parr (a civilian), and other family members.

Mr. Parr submitted a complaint to the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC).8 The IPCC judged that the original MPS investigation into the leak was inadequate and ordered it to be carried out again. This time it found that The Sun had made two payments for Mr. Maxwell’s information.9

However, even this investigation was inadequate since it failed to name or pursue the person(s) whom had received the payment(s). Mr. Maxwell, therefore, escalated his complaint to the Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Rt. Hon Theresa May, on 14 October 2012.10 Mr. Maxwell has yet to receive any response from the Secretary of State.

Although the article never went to press, Mr. Maxwell was extremely distressed by the MPS’ leak. Instead of protecting him, the MPS, once again, had resorted to victimisation. This was particularly cruel since, by summer 2010, the MPS was well aware of Mr. Maxwell’s health issues. Critically, this episode also raises further serious questions about the MPS and its well-known culture of leaking confidential information.11 As a result of this incident, Mr. Maxwell submitted a second claim to the ET for further victimisation and harassment.

The leak of personal information about one of its own counter-terrorism officers suggests that senior managers in the MPS either approved this unauthorised (and possibly criminal) activity or have lost control of the officers under their command. The failure to carry out a proper investigation is a further indictment of the leadership in failing to take such matters seriously.

C. Employment Tribunal & Employment Appeal Tribunal Judgments

On 12 February 2012, the Employment Tribunal (ET) held that the MPS had committed forty-four counts of discrimination against Mr. Maxwell. This included nineteen counts of harassment, fourteen counts of direct discrimination and eleven counts of victimisation.12

Rather than accept and seek to remedy its wrongdoing, the MPS appealed almost every finding to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (“Appeal Tribunal”). On 14 March 2013, the Appeal Tribunal upheld over ninety percent of Mr. Maxwell’s complaints.13 Mr. Justice Supperstone remarked, “It is clear that the tribunal considered all the evidence in relation to each and every allegation with considerable care”.14 He concluded that the basis of the MPS’ appeal was “without merit”.15

The MPS had been warned almost a year previously by the Appeal Tribunal “[to] consider whether all of [its] grounds [of appeal] should be argued in light of the difficulties…”.16 The MPS ignored the judge’s warning to its own detriment and at considerable cost to the public purse.

The decision to persist with a futile appeal, rather than tackle the problem of discrimination, suggests failure of the MPS’ leadership to understand the problem and to take the correct action. If senior managers had taken decisive action when required, it may have prevented the inevitable harm to both Mr. Maxwell and the MPS itself. As the Tribunal had said:

“The Tribunal also finds it surprising, given the number of senior officers involved, that applying the Reporting of Wrongdoing Policy in the laudable and clear terms set out within the police was not tackled head on… Had the Respondent embraced and implemented its own Reporting Wrongdoing Policy correctly at the outset, then matters might have turned out differently.”17

Following three years’ litigation and two lengthy tribunal processes, two employment judges had found serious failings at the highest levels within the MPS.

The MPS’ only response to the EAT’s decision was to claim they were “disappointed by the Employment Appeals Tribunal’s decision” (rather than the discriminatory conduct of its own officers).18 To the best of our knowledge, at no point has the MPS’ leadership accepted the findings of the tribunals. Nor have they issued an apology to Mr. Maxwell for his long ordeal.

III. Failures of Leadership within the Metropolitan Police Service

The failures within the MPS can broadly be subdivided into two different areas:

A.Failure to address racial and homophobic discrimination and harassment amongst officers at operational level;

B.Failure of senior leadership to investigate allegations, protect complainants and prevent further victimisation.

A. Discrimination and Harassment amongst Officers at Operational Level

The Tribunal found a number of examples of day-to-day discrimination and harassment amongst low/mid-level officers whilst on duty. Examples include:19

SO15 officers regularly used BME officers as “buffers” whilst undertaking so-called “random” embarkation controls. This practice consisted of requesting that officers of black, Asian or Middle Eastern appearance or descent stop passengers from black, Asian or Middle Eastern backgrounds. As Mr. Maxwell’s recounts, “blacks don’t complain when they are stopped by blacks”. Once the departing passengers had been stopped by officers of apparently the same or similar ethnic background, they were “handed over” to white officers for further inspection. The ET found that using minority officers in this way was tantamount to direct discrimination and racial harassment.20

A white officer, who was one of Mr. Maxwell’s colleagues at Heathrow Airport, referred to a fellow black colleague as “one of those people”. It was clear to Mr. Maxwell that this comment referred to colour of their joint colleague’s skin, and that the officer had also intended to harass Mr. Maxwell by this comment.21

During a rest break at Heathrow Airport, one of Mr. Maxwell’s colleagues began to discuss “gays”. Amongst other offensive remarks, he spoke disparagingly about “them taking it up the arse”.22

During a counter-terrorism training session at Paddington Police Station, the instructing officer projected an image depicting a man at a fairground. The officer said: “[he] is as gay as a gay in a gay tea shop”. All of the other officers in attendance, including senior members of the Command, laughed.23

These events are but a few examples of the discrimination and harassment that Mr. Maxwell experienced on a near daily basis whilst based at Heathrow Airport. He first raised concerns with the supervising officer of his line manager in November 2008 but the MPS did not take him seriously.

Of equal concern to the Committee will be the potential for the so-called “buffering tactics” to lead to direct discrimination against the general public. For instance, if the criterion on which a commanding officer decides which member of his/her team should stop a specific passenger is because the officer and passenger supposedly possess a similar appearance/ethnicity, this is a highly discriminatory practice against both officer and passenger alike.24

If the MPS fails to address racism and discrimination within in its own ranks, the “spill-over” of such racism and bigotry onto the general public is inevitable. Accordingly, before addressing how it treats the public, the MPS needs to get its own house in order.

Mr. Maxwell submits that the MPS leadership must root out racism and homophobia against its own officers in the lower ranks, before it will able to prevent discriminatory attitude and behaviour towards the general public.

B. Failure to Investigate Accusations, Protect Complainants and Prevent Further Discrimination

Perhaps the most surprising element of Mr. Maxwell’s case was the MPS’ failure to adequately investigate Mr. Maxwell’s accusations and, in turn, affect any remedial action. The MPS, instead, proceeded to adopt a stance towards Mr. Maxwell that was at first complacent and disinterested, and then became characterised by intimidation and victimisation.

The Tribunal was particularly worried by a number of incidents:

During Mr. Maxwell’s initial period of illness, senior officers at the MPS treated his complaints of racism and homophobia and issues about his health dismissively, adopting a disparaging approach towards him. For example, the Tribunal noted that they recommended to each other by email that they should have “a large malt in hand” when dealing with his case.25

When speaking with his designated point of contact at the MPS, Detective Inspector Quantrell (herein DI Quantrell), Mr. Maxwell commented that it was “difficult being gay and black in the police”. DI Quantrell responded: “That’s life”. The Tribunal affirmed that the MPS did not take Mr. Maxwell’s claims seriously and senior staff members tried to minimise their importance. They, instead, implied that racism and homophobia were “natural” and inevitable occurrences in the Police Service and that he should not try to challenge this.26

When Mr. Maxwell began to recount specific accusations against former colleagues, DI Quantrell advised him that others would be wary of him “if you get them [fellow officers] in trouble with the organisation”. Mr. Maxwell was thus advised by a senior officer not to follow the formal channels of complaint lest it affect his reputation or future career prospects at the MPS. Through the use of the word “trouble”, in particular, the senior MPS officer appeared to render Mr. Maxwell a sort of “problem” or “obstruction”.27

The next month, DI Quantrell tried to access Mr. Maxwell’s confidential personnel file at the GMP’s offices. The GMP telephoned Mr. Maxwell to inform him that a representative of the MPS had tried to acquire his records without his permission. When Mr. Maxwell questioned DI Quantrell he informed Mr. Maxwell that it was he whom was attempting to ascertain whether “he [Mr. Maxwell] was a troublemaker or okay”. Once more, the MPS’ inference was clear: without any formal investigation, they sort to immediately disbelieve Mr. Maxwell’s accusations and were convinced that he was both a troublemaker and a problem that needed to disappear.28

During a MPS Case Conference on Mr. Maxwell’s situation, DI Quantrell carelessly misreported a complaint by Mr. Maxwell that fellow officers at Heathrow Airport had called him a “faggot” and a “queer”. In fact, different homophobic insults had been used. The Tribunal stated “the lack of detail is important because it does show a lack of care in dealing with [complaints of discrimination]”. Judge Byrne stated that “[this] illustrates perhaps subconscious assumption…” as to what a gay person should find offensive.29

The Tribunal also found that DI Quantrell’s excessive attempts to contact Mr. Maxwell during October 2009 were victimisation. DI Quantrell’s continual requests for updates regarding his health intimidated Mr. Maxwell. Since he had already been on sick leave for the best part of three months, it was unreasonable for his designated point-of-contact to call on several occasions each week to obtain an update. Moreover, DI Quantrell was unwilling to permit contact via email, Mr. Maxwell’s preferred form of communication. Instead, he always insisted on communication via telephone, something that increased Mr. Maxwell’s anxiety. Despite the MPS’ knowledge of Mr. Maxwell’s high anxiety and severe depression, it seems that senior members of the MPS were still willing to pressurise and bully him.30

Following an informal meeting with representatives of the MPS, Mr. Maxwell dispatched a formal letter registering his unhappiness with the manner in which the MPS had dealt with his complaints of racism and homophobia. Mr. Maxwell received angry text messages from DI Quantrell that lambasted him for submitting a formal grievance. Again, the MPS disapproved with Mr. Maxwell’s desire to follow the regular channels for complaint, and instead attempted to pressurise him to take another course.31

When Mr. Maxwell met Detective Chief Inspector (“DCI”) D’Orsi, it was conceded by the DCI that SO15 was not an appropriate Directorate for Mr. Maxwell because, he admitted, the counter-terrorism command had “issues” with racism and homophobia. Instead, the Detective Chief Inspector suggested that Mr. Maxwell “would be more suited to local policing and not a specialist department” as the “officers are more diverse and [he] won’t see the issues that [he] had at Special Branch”.32 The Tribunal considered that the DCI was conceding that there were issues of racism and homophobia in SO15, but instead of rooting it out, the MPS preferred that Mr. Maxwell move to another department so that they could continue ignoring a serious problem. 33

The Tribunal’s findings against the MPS may be summarised as follows:

failure to take allegations of harassment and discrimination seriously;

failure to investigate allegations sensitively and expediently, or at all;

persistence of an institutional culture geared towards “containment” and “covering-up” instead of investigation and redress;

regular employment of intimidatory tactics to exert pressure upon victims so that they do not to raise a formal grievance;

repeated failure to train officers in how to implement the MPS’ Reporting of Wrongdoing Policy;34 and

failure to address institutionalised racism and homophobia within specific operational commands.

Both tribunals found that one MPS officer in particular, Nigel Quantrell, to be responsible for the harassment and victimisation that Mr. Maxwell received whilst he was convalescing. It is therefore surprising that this member of the MPS’s senior leadership team has been promoted on two occasions since 2009. First, it seems that Mr. Quantrell served as Chief Inspector of Hillingdon Police with, quite shockingly, responsibility for, inter alia, diversity and professional standards.35

In December 2012, Mr. Quantrell was then promoted to Superintendent of Lambeth Police with overall responsibility for Operation Trident in the borough.36 As per the MPS’ own description of this Operation, a key “enabler” is community relations: “speaking and listening to communities and acting on their concerns”.37 Given the ET and EAT’s definitive findings against Mr. Quantrell, it is extraordinary that he has been promoted to posts that require developing trust with different communities in one of London’s most diverse boroughs. By promoting officers like Mr. Quantrell to such senior ranks, moreover, the inference is clear: those who abuse are promoted; those who report wrongdoing are victimised.

Mr. Maxwell submits that the failure to take discrimination seriously and failure to investigate are failures of leadership that have a trickledown effect upon the organisation as a whole. MPS’ senior managers must take the lead and set the example that discrimination is not acceptable. This can only be done by a commitment at the highest level to proper investigation and accountability.

The MPS’ culture of “containment” and “covering-up”, moreover, punishes the victims and not perpetrators. As this submission demonstrates, various senior MPS officials acknowledge that racism and discrimination is part of the fabric of the MPS.

IV. Impact Upon Diversity and Equality in the UK Police

The human element of this Submission concerns the sad but preventable story of how a competent and well-regarded young police officer was “hounded out [of the MPS] like an “enemy of the state”.38 Indeed, in his final Performance Development Review, Mr. Maxwell’s supervising officer remarked: “[Kevin] takes full responsibility for his work which is completed to a high standard”. Concluding: “[he is] a strong team player […] well-liked and respected by the team who value his contribution and effort”.39

Beyond Kevin Maxwell’s story, however, there are also broader concerns for the MPS as an institution. Mr. Maxwell notes recent evidence provided by Retired Chief Superintendent Dal Babu to the Home Affairs Committee concerning the lack of BME officers in UK police services and, in particular, the failure of these officers to be promoted to senior ranks.40 Current MPS Commissioner Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, however, believes that there could be a BME MPS Commissioner within ten years.41 This seems somewhat unlikely since there are currently no BME officers from any UK police service on the strategic command course, an executive training course for mid-level officers seeking promotion to chief officer rank. Indeed, earlier this year, the Minister of State for Policing and Justice, the Rt. Hon Damian Green, commented that he “was struck by how far we still need to improve representation of women, black and minority ethnic populations and other protected groups in the police, especially at senior levels”.42

Sir Peter Fahy, Lead Spokesperson on workforce development for the Association of Chief Police Officers and Chief Constable of the Great Manchester Police, recently asserted that a more diverse police force should be a legal requirement:

This is not about targets or political correctness. It is about operational need. Policing is unique, we need to be legitimate within the community because of the exercise of power. Often we are out there resolving disputes between communities and we need officers that understand different communities and different backgrounds. Then there is the practical stuff about surveillance and undercover officers […] the operational need is great.43

Charles Crichlow, President of the National Black Police Association (NBPA), concurs: “It is unacceptable that in the twenty first century less than 5% of Police Officers in England and Wales are from Black and ethnic minority backgrounds”.44 The NBPA also claim that the MPS is still largely “institutionally racist”, citing evidence of disproportionate use of stop-and-search against the black community and lack of advancement by senior minority officers.45

The public agree. 59% of BME Londoners consider the MPS as “institutionally racist”.46 In order for the Police Service to recruit a greater quantity of officers from BME backgrounds, they must change widespread public perception. Crucially, this change must start from within. This is supported by the recent evidence of Mike Fuller, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of the Crown Prosecution Service and Former Chief Constable of Kent Police, to the Home Affairs Committee: “One of things I did [whilst at Kent Police] was to make it quite clear that racism would not be tolerated, very much a zero-tolerance policy, andthat has to come from the top and there has to be will from the top and the top management team and governance mechanism as well”.47

We also submit that elite police commands such as Special Operations 15 are particularly sensitive in nature. Not only does SO15 undertake counter-terrorism operations at all ports of entry into and exit from London, but we also understand from media reports that this Command is charged with the responsibility for investigating the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby.48Given the intense media interest in this case, the actions and behaviour of officers belonging to SO15 are likely to come under high levels of scrutiny. If some of the officers that have been seconded to the Command are unable to interact with their colleagues without resorting to discriminatory victimisation and harassment, this does not bode well for this Directorate’s treatment of the general public. Moreover, given the nature of its duties, any failures in the counter-terrorism command could have a serious impact upon national security and, as such, place the general public at risk.

V. Conclusion

Kevin Maxwell was a young and talented police officer who had served with distinction in the Greater Manchester Police. His abilities were well known to his superiors, and he was well liked and respected by his colleagues. Shortly after the Metropolitan Police Service created Special Operations 15—an elite command charged with the responsibility of providing a rigorous and coherent response to threat of terrorism in London—Mr. Maxwell was invited to join.

Soon after commencing his role at Heathrow Airport, he became upset and concerned by the racist and homophobic manner in which a number of his colleagues behaved. When Mr. Maxwell tried to raise his concerns with senior leadership in SO15, he was ignored.

As the harassment and discrimination at Heathrow continued, Mr. Maxwell became evermore distressed and anxious. Such was the trauma of these events that our Client was forced to take extended sick leave and later resign his position. He now suffers from chronic depression characterised by high levels of anxiety, he is unemployed and homeless, and possesses spiralling levels of personal debt. He feels utterly betrayed by the MPS. He feels the MPS tried to destroy him.

As this Submission makes clear, this outcome was preventable. Had the leadership within the MPS acted more swiftly and decisively to tackle discrimination and harassment, the MPS would still benefit from an excellent asset, and Mr. Maxwell would still have a home and a job. Large sums of taxpayers’ money and countless hours of MPS time, moreover, would have been saved.

As opposed to admit fault and sanction corrective behaviour, the MPS pursued Mr. Maxwell through two employment tribunals. In both, the MPS was found to be at fault.

The clock cannot be set back for Mr. Maxwell, nor the years of suffering undone. Through his campaigning efforts, he seeks to improve the climate under which black and other minority officers serve. Ultimately, he hopes that no other officers suffer like he has.

By way of conclusion, Mr. Maxwell offers the Committee the following recommendations:

Change should come from the top: If the MPS wishes to stamp out racism, homophobia and other prejudice within the MPS, there must be decisive and unwavering support at the highest echelons in the MPS.

Zero Tolerance on discrimination at operational levels: If the MPS wants to prevent racism and discrimination, they must apply a zero tolerance policy at all operational levels. All complaints must be treated seriously, thoroughly and vigorously investigated and, where necessary, appropriate sanctions applied.

Ensure a victim-centred approach: When undertaking internal investigations into specific complaints, the MPS’ principal focus must be to protect victims. The MPS must not seek to harass or victimise whistle-blowers into silence.

Rigorously enforce standards within MPS to prevent “spill-over” into interactions with the public: If the MPS wants to ensure that its officers treat the general public with the according dignity and respect, they must first get their “own house” in order. A police service that is discriminatory on the inside, will also be discriminatory on the outside.

Change requires transparency and openness: The MPS current culture of “containment” and “covering-up” punishes the victims and not the perpetrators. To affect meaningful change, the MPS must be open and transparent in its investigations, both to serving officers as well as the general public as a whole.

Procedures exist to be enforced: The employment tribunals found that the MPS had an adequate Reporting of Wrongdoing Policy (RWP) but failed to implement it. Going forward, the RWP must be an essential part of management training; senior management who circumvent the RWP should be punished.

The MPS needs to change in order to achieve wider community participation: Recent polls have shown that trust in the Police amongst BME and other non-white communities remains low. So long as the MPS appears to be “institutionally racist”, the MPS have little chance in recruiting more candidates from diverse backgrounds.

Kevin Maxwell
With the kind assistance of McCue & Partners LLP: Courtenay Barklem, Matthew Jury and Stefan Hyman

June 2013

1Metropolitan Police Service, “What is SO15?”, http://www.metpolicecareers.co.uk/ctc/what_is_so15.html. Date of last access: 12 June 2013.

2The Guardian, “Black and Gay Police Officer Hounded Out like “Enemy of the State”“, 18 May 2013; The Times, “Why Kevin Maxwell refused to be a gay poster boy for the police”, 23 May 2013.

3Employment Tribunal, JudgmentMr. K Maxwell v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 12 February 2012; Employment Appeal Tribunal, JudgmentMr. K Maxwell v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 14 May 2013.

4Employment Tribunal, JudgmentMr. K Maxwell v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 12 February 2012; Employment Appeal Tribunal, JudgmentMr. K Maxwell v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, 14 May 2013.

5Employment Tribunal, Judgment, Para. 211.

6Ibid., Paras. 296-8; Employment Appeal Tribunal, Judgment, Para. 83.

7Employment Tribunal, Judgment, Para. 211.

8Note: warranted officers are not permitted to submit claims to the IPCC, so Mr. Maxwell’s partner, Mr. Parr, filed the initial complaint.

9Letter from Detective Sergeant Helen Thomas to Mr. Alex Parr, 11 October 2012.Note: this correspondence is not in the public domain. Upon request, and subject to Mr. Maxwell’s approval, we will be able to provide the Committee with a copy of this document.

10Letter from Mr. Kevin Maxwell to Rt. Hon Theresa May MP, Secretary of State for the Home Department, 14 October 2010.
Note: this correspondence is not in the public domain. Upon request, and subject to Mr. Maxwell’s approval, we will be able to provide the Committee with a copy of this document.

11This claim is sustained by a large number of recent incidents. See, amongst others, The Independent, “Former Met police officer Paul Flattley jailed for selling information about Kate Middleton and John Terry to The Sun”, 5 June 2013; The Guardian, “Police officer found guilty of trying to sell information to the News of the World”, 11 January 2013; Metro UK, “Phone hacking: News International “paid Met police officers for information”, 6 July 2011; The Times, “Met officer arrested for leaking information to press without payment “, 15 February 2013; BBC News Online, “Operation Elveden: Three arrested in Hertfordshire and Surrey”, 17 January 2013.

12Employment Tribunal, Judgment, Paras. 238-301.

13Employment Appeal Tribunal, Judgment, Paras. 84-9.

14Ibid., Para. 84.

15Ibid., Para. 86.

16Employment Appeal Tribunal, Order for Directions, 1 May 2012, Para. 11.

17Employment Tribunal, Judgment, Para. 301.

18The Times, 15 May 2013.

19The Employment Tribunal found that all of the incidents listed in this section constituted, in fact, direct discrimination or harassment. It should be noted, however, that a few of these claims were dismissed upon the MPS’ appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal since Mr. Maxwell’s application fell outside the specified window for complaint (ninety days). Nevertheless, these incidents have been included within this Submission since they are relevant and were upheld in spirit by the Tribunal.

20Employment Tribunal, Judgment, Para. 32 & 263-4.

21Ibid., Para. 268.

22Ibid., Para. 265.

23Ibid., Para. 269.

24In the interests of balance, it is important to note that the Employment Tribunal affirmed that on some specific occasions, this “targeting” practice may be acceptable, but only when there is a sensible, legitimate and logical reason why it is more appropriate for an officer from a particular background to approach a specific passenger. Crucially, this “targeting” must be very much the exception, not the rule.

25Ibid., Para. 99 & 273.

26Ibid., Para. 274.

27Ibid., Para. 278.

28Ibid., Para. 282.

29Ibid., Para. 280.

30Ibid., Para. 284.

31Ibid., Para. 286.

32Ibid., Para. 149.

33Ibid., Para. 285.

34Judge Byrne concluded “the Respondent failed to train officers in the application of the [Reporting of Wrongdoing] policy and failed to comply with it on this occasion” ET Para 301. Note: Emphasis added.

35Metropolitan Police Service, Organisation Chart for Hillingdon Police (6 December 2011), http://www.met.police.uk/foi/pdfs/who_we_are_and_what_we_do/borough/hillingdon_organisational_chart_2011.pdf, Date of last access: 13 June 2013.

36Metropolitan Police Service, Senior Leadership Team for Lambeth Police http://content.met.police.uk/Article/Senior-Leadership-Team/1400016941335/1400016941335?scope_id=1257246764163′, Date of last access: 13 June 2013.

37Metropolitan Police Service, Trident: Gun Crime Command, http://content.met.police.uk/Article/Who-we-are/1400014982729/gangcrime, Date of last access: 13 June 2013.

38The Times, 15 May 2013.

39Employment Tribunal, Judgment, Para. 69.

40House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, Uncorrected Transcript of Oral Evidence: Leadership and Standards in the Police Service, 23 April 2013.

41Evening Standard, “The Met ‘could have its first black chief within the next ten years”’,http://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/the-met-could-have-its-first-black-chief-within-the-next-10-years-8580062.html. Date of last access: 14 June 2013.

42The Guardian, “Call for new law to force police to tackle diversity crisis at the top”, 27 January 2013.

43Ibid.

44National Black Police Association, NBPA Press Release: Stephen Lawrence, Twenty Years On, http://www.nbpa.co.uk/home/nbpa-press-release, Date of last access: 14 June 2013.

45Ibid.

46ITV News Online, “59% of minorities thinks Met is institutionally racist”, 23 April 2013.

47House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, 23 April 2013. Note: emphasis added.

48Sky News Online, ‘Woolwich Murder Suspect “Held Two Months Ago”’, 26 May 2013.